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Introduction. The Moral and Affectual
Dimension of Collective Action in South
Asia
Amélie Blom et Nicolas Jaoul
1 ‘No politics’ says the roaring tiger that illustrates this special issue of SAMAJ. This sticker
was bought from a street vendor in Kanpur, a city located in the Indian state of Uttar
Pradesh, during a celebration of the Ambedkar jayanti (birthday commemoration) in 2008.
It  is  highly  indicative  of  the  way  emotions  can  be  valorized  as  pure  and  authentic
expressions from the body, and pitted against regular politics, stigmatized as the impure
realm of politicking, deals and compromises. This explicit denial of politics,  however,
seems too assertive to be taken for granted.  It  instead brings emotion back into the
semantic field of politics, albeit politics at its first degree, as pure natural, and idealized
reaction, a kind of ‘darwinian’ instinct of survival. The anger of the tiger can only result
from its feeling of being in danger, which justifies its determination to attack; in other
words, there is no compromise when the feeling of being under threat arises. 
2 The passage from animal nature to human pride is revealing: natural instinct becomes a
metaphor for human emotions, while the defence of one’s cultural values seems to call for
uncompromising  and  heroic  behaviour.  The  tiger  icon  interestingly  resembles  the
Mumbai-based Shiv Sena’s emblem, an organization that has appropriated the Bollywood
hero’s anger at injustice as its theatrical marque de fabrique.1 But the fact that it was found
in a Dalit meeting also points to the circulation, and wide and popular acceptance of these
ideas that  are presented as  ‘natural’. The popular politics  of  emotion and its  use by
different actors, whether inside or at the margins of the conventional political field, is
what this special issue of SAMAJ seeks to explore through various examples taken from
across the Subcontinent.
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‘Outraged communities’ in South Asia’s contemporary
history
3 ‘There  is  no  collective  action  without  perceiving,  communicating,  dramatizing  and
legitimizing  an  experience  of  indignation’  (Cefaï  2007:  163).  The  South  Asian  cases
presented in this issue indeed testify to a particularly acute sense of outrage in collective
action.  Although  not  devoid  of  political  claims,  they  are  mainly  articulated  around
expressions of moral discontent, claims for reparation or calls for revenge. 
4 Communal conflicts caused by ritualized provocations and subsequent feelings of moral
outrage  have  a  long  history  in  the  Indian  Subcontinent  dating  prior  to  British
colonization (Baily 1985; Gaborieau 1985). The 1857 revolt itself was triggered by Indian
soldiers refusing to open cartridges that contained beef and pig substances, thus breaking
their religious taboos. As shown by the Cow Protection Movement initiated by the radical
nationalist  B.G.  Tilak  in  the  late  19th century,  such defence  of  community  values  or
religious symbols became a method of popular mobilization that played an important
part in the mass politicization that occurred subsequently (Freitag 1989; Pandey 1990).
5 Interestingly,  such  popular  mobilizations  on  issues  of  outrage  decreased  only
temporarily, and not totally after Independence, when angry crowds continued to display
publicly their communal sensitivities, and took to the streets with remarkable regularity.
To cite only the most historically significant cases, the Dravidians protested in the 1950s
against the imposition of the Hindi language (Assayag 2001), while Pakistan witnessed a
violent anti-Ahmadi campaign organized by Islamic groups irked by their heterodoxy.
The 1980s marked a new height in such ‘politics of outrage’ by communal organizations.
Sikhs mobilized after the desecration of the Golden Temple (1984); Muslims protested
against Salman Rushdie’s and Taslima Nasreen’s novels (1988-89 and 1994 respectively),
and, more recently, against the Danish caricatures of Prophet Muhammad (2006); Hindu
nationalists rose from political marginality to regional state power in the wake of their
campaign  against  Ayodhya’s  Babri  Masjid  in  the  early  1990s;  since  the  late  1990s,
Ambedkarite  Dalits  have  also  resorted  to  violence  after  the  Ambedkar  statues  were
desecrated, etc. 
6 Such movements have deeply marked the Subcontinent’s  recent  history.  While  these
events attracted much scholarly and media attention, they are like ‘big trees’ hiding the
‘forest’ of numerous small scale and local events that are reported everyday in the local
press. For instance, in India recently, a conflict erupted in Singur against forcible land
acquisition: a peasant refusing to part with his land was quoted saying that ‘land is like a
mother. I’ll never sell my mother’ (Le Monde 6th September 2008). This statement shows
that even land-related conflicts that are not ‘communal’ and that one would expect to be
fought on other grounds, can easily acquire the same affectionate overtones as communal
ones, indicating the pervasiveness of the language of outrage in South Asian collective
action.
7 Mobilizations of ‘outraged communities’ in South Asia occur too often, cut across too
many  diverse  communities,  regions,  nations  as  well  as  historical  epochs,  to  remain
treated as isolated case studies. This special issue was prompted by such an observation.2
Indeed, it seems to indicate that mobilizations over outrage constitute a specific pattern
of  public  assertion  and  collective  action.  They  could  even  be  considered  a  singular
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thematic pattern of what Charles Tilly calls a repertoire of collective action, i.e. inherited
and constantly reactivated methods and rituals of public protest that run through time
and make for the continuity of popular means of protests across historical epochs and
regimes, enabling and constraining collective action concurrently (Tilly 1986). 
8 The framing of discontent into the vocabulary of moral outrage, as well as the public
emotions they entail, the popular rhetoric and use of moral values, the strong affective
implications and the routinized, yet always innovative, pattern in which such moral and
emotional claims are publicly manifested, constitute, in our view, specific dimensions of
South Asia’s political culture that call for a thorough investigation. But we would like to
clarify any misunderstanding regarding our use of the notion of ‘culture’. The culturalist
trap that consists of taking culture as the ultimate explanation of human action can be
avoided,  if  we follow a  more dynamic approach to  culture,  where individual  actions
instead become accountable for the uses, the continuation of and the changes in culture.
As James Jasper has noted:
Strategizing, in particular, is a matter of sometimes following culturally ingrained
rules but at other times bending them, breaking them, playing off them to thwart
expectations.  As  Swidler  shows,  strategies  put  culture  into  action  /…/  Socially
constructed meanings and practices can exert considerable constraint or provide
equal room for creativity (Jasper 1997: 52).
9 The comparative perspective adopted in this volume will help us delineate more precisely
the dynamic features of the politics of outrage. We also hope that it will provide some
insight on South Asia’s vibrant and enduring culture of public dissent.
 
The complex politics of South Asian ‘outraged
communities’
10 The recrudescence of  communal  violence in South Asia  since the 1980s  has  led to a
scholarly focus on violence, from questions regarding crowd behaviour to more systemic
overviews of the politics of communal violence. Yet, outrage has not been addressed as
such. Paul Brass (1997) convincingly demonstrates how communal violence can become
institutionalized in  certain local  set  ups  and highlights  the  subtle  division of  labour
between  a  whole  range  of  local  actors  involved  in  such  conflicts.  His  emphasis  on
manipulation, however, fails to give an account of the reasons why ordinary people can
play a game in which they often end up as the victims. He thus considers as mere pretext
what he calls ‘precipitating incidents’ (Brass 1997: 6), that are, if not fabricated, then at
least  exploited in order to make purposely built  communal  tensions degenerate into
violence.
11 In the same manner, Stanley Tambiah (1996), in his often praised, comprehensive and
comparative  study  of  South  Asian  communal  riots,  seeks  to  take  into  account  their
psychological  intensity,  but  fails  to  deal  in  a  satisfying  manner  with  the  popular
narratives and moral justifications that accompany and even inform such violence. In his
list of elements conducive to communal violence, the fifth and, significantly perhaps, also
the last is: ‘an array of ‘triggering actions’ that are publicly recognized as challenges,
slights, insults, and desecrations inviting reprisal’ (Tambiah 1996: 233).3 It is interesting
to note that he consigns such ‘triggering events’ to the realm of timeless and borderless
‘rumours’ that ‘cluster around themes and issues repeated again in history in diverse
places and times’ (Tambiah 1996: 236). Hence, the question of outrage is again relegated
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to the background, and opposed to ‘a number of other interests and differences, whose
contention and resolution are also at the heart of the matter’ (Tambiah 1996: 234).
12 There is no point in denying the causal importance of such social, political and economic
stakes  that  can  make  communal  violence  a  viable  option  for  certain  actors  whose
immediate political calculations it matches. By highlighting them, authors, such as Brass
and  Tambiah,  certainly  made  a  major  contribution  to  the  proper  understanding  of
communal  conflict  in  South  Asia,  and  also  gave  a  decisive  blow  to  the  essentialist
conceptions  that  took  such  conflicts  for  granted.  Yet,  the  main  shortcoming  of  the
instrumentalist school is to ignore the popular agency and meanings that are actively
involved in the production of communal violence. The ‘precipitating incidents’, that form
the rough material of outrage, should in fact be treated as highly meaningful and crucial.
In order to precisely find out  the popular stakes of  protests  (from conventional  and
accepted repertoires of collective action to more or less organized forms of violence), an
understanding of their moral incentives or ‘justifications’ is required.
13 As the French critiques of the theories of ethnicity Jocelyne Streiff Feinart and Philippe
Poutignat (1995) have argued, the instrumentalist paradigm inadvertently falls back on
the very same essentialist notions that it seeks to combat. A case in point is Tambiah’s
proposition that there is a lack of shared values in such conflicts, a somewhat culturalist
postulate, which takes for granted or overestimates the ‘cultural gap’ between religious
communities.  The  syncretism argument,  highlighting  all  that  communities  culturally
share across communal boundaries, has rightly been criticized as ‘naïve’, and it has also
been noted that it corresponds in India to the official secular ideology of the Congress
Party (Gaborieau 1985).
14 Beyond  this  argument,  several  works  more  interestingly  point  to  some  degree  of
ideological unity between diverse communal discourses, despite the fact that their aim is
to emphasize cultural difference. For example, Christophe Jaffrelot (1996) has analyzed
the imitation of the Khilafat movement by the Hindu Sangathan movement in the early 20
th century in spite of its clear-cut opposition to Muslims; a conscious mimetic process that
he has labelled ‘strategic syncretism’. In an article on the Sikh pogroms of 1984, Veena
Das (1998) also shows how pre-existing nationalist narratives and representations of the
nation  resurface  in  communal  narratives  as  well  as  in  popular  stereotypes  on  Sikh
violence. She notes that ‘no matter at what point one chooses to begin a story, there is
always a prior story waiting to be activated, one that has been lying inert or circulating’
(Das 1998: 110).
15 Reflecting upon 19th century popular mobilizations in ‘public arenas’,  Sandria Freitag
emphasizes that ‘the resulting cultural expressions offered alternative ideologies to those
forged in the state’s political realm’, which created ‘shared values’ and ‘a shared language
in which to argue’ (Freitag 1996: 213, 217). She also brings to our notice the ‘passionate
devotionalism’ adopted by individuals in the defence of collective claims. She proposes a
list  of  recurring  features  of  public  arena  mobilizations  that  point  to  their  unity:
community, state, dramatic moments, special vocabulary, claims in public, swaying public
opinion, mobilization in the streets featuring violence, and creation of an ‘Other’ (Freitag
1996: 219, 220-2). Thomas Hansen (2005) also makes a decisive step towards a unified
comprehension of South Asian communalist movements’ discourses when he points to
their common claim to sovereignty that competes with the state’s public authority over
what they claim to be ‘their’  social  constituencies.  He thus argues that  despite their
conflicting claims, such movements are equally based on the notion of ‘‘communities’ as
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the  natural  repositories  of  morality  and  ethical  life  in  India,  separated  from,  and
conceptually opposed to, the ‘state’’ (Hansen 2005: 124).
16 The instrumentalist paradigm provides a top-down explanation focusing exclusively on
the fulfilment of elite interests and in which elites are often caricatured as utilitarian and
manipulative (while the popular base is seen as manipulated and alienated). The so-called
‘moral economy’ approach provides a better understanding of what motivates people to
actually  become  involved  in  riots  and  other  forms  of  street  agitations.  This  idea,
developed by E.P.  Thompson (1991),  and the academic reflection that came out of  it,
proves to be more heuristic  in our exploratory approach towards the articulation of
collective action and moral outrage. Although it has a loose and unsatisfying definition,
and although the term ‘moral economy’ itself is employed in a metonymic manner that is
clearly confusing, the approach remains extremely rich in the possibilities it creates for
the analysis of the ambiguous linkage between popular insurgencies and the consensual
realm of moral values.
17 The  moral  economy approach probably  appeared  in  the  1830s  ‘in  a  polemic  against
political economists’, whose defence of Adam Smith’s theory of economic liberalism was
opposed to the old economy of subsistence based on local patronage of the rural elites
(Thompson 1991:337). While the 18th century food riots in England had generally been
considered to be the mere mechanic reactions of the belly prompted by bad harvests and
dearth (a conception that  Thompson dismisses as  a  ‘spasmodic view’  of  history),  the
historian reintroduced the insurgents’ moral incentives and claims. He emphasizes the
subaltern uses of such patronage for food security purposes, and focuses on the popular
uses of consensual moral values for their own perceived economic interests (even if it is
limited to food security and has nothing revolutionary). In a departure from the political
economists’ narrow and monopolistic definition of economic rationality, Thompson thus
renews the historiography of popular revolts by stressing the claims, modalities of action
and moral values of the insurgents, which help him identify a specific popular agency (a
sort of ‘pre-class’ consciousness of the toiling masses).
18 Although Thompson’s definition of the moral economy remains an economic one,4 he
engages in a wider theoretical discussion regarding the popular uses and understandings
of ‘shared values’, especially during popular insurgencies. Indeed, it is chiefly in the name
of preserving established moral values that insurgents try to defend the old patronage
model.  In  his  review  of  the  critiques,  and  academic  uses,  of  the  notion  of  ‘moral
economy’, Thompson acknowledged that he welcomed its expanded use:
The deep emotions stirred by dearth, the claims which the crowd made upon the
authorities  in  such  crises,  and  the  outrage  provoked  by  profiteering  in  life-
threatening emergencies, imparted a particular ‘moral’ charge to the protest. All of
this, taken together, is what I understand by moral economy (Thompson 1991: 338).
19 However, by neglecting to clarify the notion’s ambiguity, the ‘moral economy’ school has
nurtured a confusion between its strictly economic aspect, and the wider theoretical issue
of the popular uses and meanings associated with moral values in relation to their more
established (elite) definitions. The ‘moral economy’ indeed ends up standing for the more
conceptual question it raises, giving the term ‘moral economy’ a metonymic connotation.
The same lack of conceptual clarity is palpable in James Scott’s attempt to strengthen the
‘moral  economy’ argument.  For example,  in his innovative ethnography of Malaysian
peasants, he states that ‘the subsistence ethic is not only a given of peasant economics,
but […] has a normative or moral dimension as well’ (Scott 1976: 11).
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20 The catch-all use of the ‘moral economy’ notion may seem slightly confusing (by mixing
indistinctly  the moral  economy proper  with what  could also  be  called the subaltern
‘economy’ or ‘grammar’ of moral values). It is actually Thompson’s concern with popular
agency as cultural, pre-Marxist (or embryonic) expressions of class, rather than with the
more specific and historically located popular defence of the old economy against the
increasingly capitalist economy, that has inspired reflections on the issue of subaltern
agency.
21 Such is the case with prestigious works like the Subaltern Studies in India and James
Scott’s second book (Scott 1985) on everyday forms of peasant resistance in South East
Asia, for which he has coined the highly successful notion of ‘weapons of the weak’. The
emphasis on moral values is even clearer in his later book (Scott 1990) where he analyzes
the passage from unorganized and constrained means of  resistance of  the seemingly
abiding, but cunningly, resisting peasants to more assertive and organized protests (i.e.
the politicization process that passes from ‘hidden transcripts’ to public assertion of a
‘dissident subculture’). Scott evokes the strategic importance for the dominated strata of
society to remain identified with the dominant values (instead of criticizing them for the
part they play in justifying the status quo), even during revolts:
The fact is that the public representations of claims by subordinate groups, even in
situations  of  conflict,  nearly  always  have a  strategic  or  dialogic  dimension that
influences the form they take. Short of the total declaration of war that one does
occasionally  find  in  the  midst  of  a  revolutionary  crisis,  most  protests  and
challenges—even quite violent ones—are made in the realistic expectation that the
central  features  of  the  form  of  domination  will  remain  intact.  So  long  as  that
expectation prevails, it is impossible to know from the public transcript alone how
much of  the  appeal  to  hegemonic  values  is  prudence  and  how much is  ethical
submission (Scott 1990: 92).
22 The ethnographic study of moral aspects of protests can thus provide important clues on
how specific claims and discontent of  the lower class may fuel  rightist  or communal
movements,  whose ideology originates from the elites rather than being moulded by
specific interests or reflecting assertive world views of the unprivileged. This has for
example been noted regarding the popular response to the Hindu Nationalists’ Ayodhya
mobilization,  whose  ideological  content  was  conservative  and  politically  designed  to
counter the political mobilization of the lower castes (Basu 1993). Yet, there is still a need
to renew our understanding of the ever changing, infinitely complex and contradictory
popular relation to ideological frameworks that originate ‘from above’ but can always
become  appropriated  ‘from  below’—and  be  partly  subverted  or  deviated  from  their
original political aims.
23 Indeed, several historians of popular dissent in colonial India point to this Janus-faced
dimension of communal conflicts, in which practical contestation against exclusion from
the public sphere by the lower class becomes entangled into a generally conservative
communal rhetoric, thus limiting the possibility of fulfilling such assertion. For example,
Nandini Gooptu’s (2001) work on the urban poor’s collective action in early 20th century
north India, shows that the participation of the poor in communal processions, led and
financed  by  conservative  sections  of  the  urban middle  class,  had  a  distinct  political
meaning from that of the organizers. Based on detailed historical ethnography, she shows
that  the  lower  caste  poor  joined with a  separate,  underlying (even if  unformulated)
agenda: physical contestation of their political exclusion from local governance, of their
powerlessness,  of  their  precariousness,  and their  vulnerability  in  the  face  of  violent
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police and municipal drives of slum evictions. Public assertions of religious communities
in which the poor were the main participants thus relied upon contradictory expressions
of class, ‘both as theatres of self-representation or affirmation of power of the dominant
classes, and as vehicles of contestation from below’ (Gooptu 2001: 21). In other words, ‘all
these various forms of politics of the poor were animated by their urge to defy exclusion
and to entrench their presence in the public sphere’ (Gooptu 2001: 422-3);  a physical
statement that encapsulates a kind of self-restrained and politically twisted lower class
agenda.
24 As the case studies included in this issue show, staged outrages provoked by such distinct
events like the public lynching of a Dalit family (see Jaoul), the publication of offensive
cartoons (see Blom), books or textbooks (see Riaz, Ali), a community leader’s ‘sacrilegious’
use of religious symbols (see Baixas & Simon), an alleged attack on Hindutva activists in a
train (see Hansen), the destruction of Buddha’s statues (see Centlivres), or the alleged
destruction  of  a  mythical  bridge  (see  Jaffrelot),  follow  distinct,  and  perhaps  even
conflicting, political agendas. However, by looking closer and in detail at the ideological
content and methods used by those who staged these reactions of outrage, we insist on
paying attention to the uses and meanings of values that are both shared and disputed. In
the following section, we propose to explore the sociological properties of ‘outrage’, as
well  as  the  intricate  ways  in  which  outrage  articulates  moral  values  and  powerful
emotions.
 
Outrage, anger, and power relations
25 Outrages, like insults, are often perceived as the very negation of politics (Bouchet 2005:
8). Indeed, they are so emotionally charged, triggering anger or even hatred, and can be
so devastating, breaking all possible dialogue, that they seem to negate the very idea of
mutual recognition, and pervert the very foundations of political relations. Consequently,
this social reality remains at the margins of studies in political science, sociology and
anthropology (unlike other moral categories such as respect or dignity).
26 Unquestionably,  the  notion of  outrage  is  ambiguous,  as  proven by  the  contradicting
definitions  provided  by  French  and  English  language  dictionaries.  In  French,  it  is
associated with ‘offence’, and understood as ‘an act that goes gravely against a rule or a
principle’  (Le  Petit  Robert).  The  offended  alone  evaluates  the  level  of  ‘gravity’,  in
accordance with a set of norms he/she expects to be followed in human interactions.
Sociological  approaches borrow from this cognitive approach: outrage is defined as a
‘complex cognitive understanding and moral awareness, reflecting our comprehension of
the world around us and sometimes of our place in it’ (Goodwin et al. 2004: 418). Yet, an
outrage is no mere cognitive process; it is deeply felt and provokes anger. The English
language precisely stresses this emotional dimension: outrage is ‘an intense feeling of
anger and shock’ (Collins English Dictionary). It is primarily defined by the emotion and
almost physical reaction it provokes.
27 Outrage is, in fact, at the juncture between the moral and the emotional realm, and this
duality (from the point of view of an obviously too neat a set of categories, if we consider
that emotions,  cognition and morality are in fact deeply intertwined and inseparable
concepts) is precisely what interests us. The common sense helps us to understand this
dimension.  When we  say  ‘it  is  outrageous’,  we  experience  something  deeper  than  a
principle-based evaluation: we are emotionally shaken and angry. Yet, we feel something
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more complex than reflex anger: we feel a righteous anger, grounded in our conviction to
occupy the moral high ground. The South Asian case studies included in the present issue
of SAMAJ clearly prove that instigating, staging and managing this ‘righteous anger’ is a
crucial  dimension in mobilizing ‘outraged communities’.  This is  something that some
social  movements  theorists  have  not  failed  to  notice.  William  Gamson  (1992),  in
particular,  highlights  the  importance  of  outrage  and  anger  in  channelling  potential
participants towards collective action through an effective ‘injustice frame’. It would be
very difficult to motivate people to react to a perceived injustice without a ‘hot button’ or
without ‘the righteous anger that puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul’ (Gamson 1992:
32).
28 Based on small  group experiments,  Gamson even shows that  when people  witness  a
transgression by an authority figure, they tend to have strong emotions of suspicion and
anger while the blame is still  to be allocated through a cognitive process.  Movement
leaders make a great effort to shift emotions from dread to outrage. In other words, they
try to connect the abstract feeling of unfairness to moral indignation, in order to sustain
the  emotions  that  will  otherwise  dissipate.  They  have  to  ‘weave  together  a  moral,
cognitive, and emotional package of attitudes’ (Goodwin et al. 2001: 16) so as to convince
people that the indignities of their everyday life can be attributed to some agents and
that their condition can be changed by taking action collectively. In this perspective,
outrage is an anger that is felt due to injustice, but one that has been efficiently framed
by social  movement entrepreneurs:  there is  someone to blame,  responsibility  can be
attributed  and  solutions  proposed.  As  the  case  studies  in  the  present  volume
demonstrate,  allocating  blame  is  indeed  a  crucial  element  in  setting  ‘outraged
communities’ into motion.
29 Feelings of injustice, as emphasized by the ‘moral economy’ approach, are linked to our
own moral visions. The moral dimension of protest had no place in a crowd’s emotional
dynamics  in  studies  done by pre-1960s  scholars  while  the rationalist  paradigms that
followed erred in  the  opposite  direction (all  protests  were  now seen as  the  narrow,
rational  pursuit  of  interests).  James  Jasper  (1997),  one  of  the  few  social  movement
theorists to reintroduce outrage and the moral variable in our understanding of social
protests, suggests that individuals are morally shocked by threats to their understanding,
or to what they love and value, not merely scared or strategically calculating the right
reaction:
Rather  than  simply  or  directly  changing  what  they  dislike—which  may  not  be
possible—,  [social  movements]  also  express  their  contempt  and  outrage over
existing practices. It is their ability to provide a moral voice that makes protest
activities so satisfying. They give us an opportunity to plumb our moral sensibilities
and  convictions,  and  to  articulate  and  elaborate  them.  And  it  is  important  to
articulate  them  publicly  and  collectively,  two  features  which,  sociologist  Emile
Durkheim insisted,  deepen the significance and emotional  impact  of  beliefs  and
feelings.  Few other  institutions  in  modern  societies  provide  this  kind  of  forum
(Jasper 1997: 5, emphasis added).
30 Hence, social protests are born out of a ‘moral shock’—that Jasper compares to an electric
shock, which puts people in an ‘attack mode’ (Jasper 1997: 106). It can be triggered by a
highly publicized event or a more localized insult; it can be sudden or gradual, dramatic
or operating like the ‘last straw’ that finally spurs action.
31 Although ‘moral shock, agency and activism have a complex relation’ (Goodwin et al. 2001:
17),5 bringing the protestors’  moral visions back in helps to ‘reanimate the sometime
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robotic image of humans’ (Lutz & White 1986: 431), long advocated by the theories of
collective action. It is particularly useful for our inquiry on types of protests in South
Asia,  wherein voicing moral  discontent,  asking for symbolic reparation or sometimes
calling for revenge, is at the heart of the mobilization. The collective actions studied in
this volume would hardly have happened if the particular event against which protestors
mobilized—the  publication  of  cartoons  or  the  revision  of  textbooks’  curriculum  in
Pakistan, the use of sacred symbols by a dissident leader or the collective lynching of a
family in India, for instance (see Blom, Ali, Baixas & Simon, Jaoul in this volume)—had not
initially shaken the protestors’ inner sense of morality and if they had not felt that they
occupied the moral high ground when protesting. Yet, one important question remains
unanswered: how precisely does a ‘moral shock’ operate?
32 Academic works on blasphemy - a prototypical form of outrage partaking of a similar
‘ethnology of the forbidden’ (Cheyronnaud & Lenclud 1992: 261) - provide some useful
answers.  Like  ‘blasphemy’,  an  outrage  emerges  and  develops  following  a  precise
‘mechanism’ or ‘apparatus’ (dispositif in French) as stressed by Jeanne Favret-Saada (1992:
257).6 This mechanism includes someone who denounces (1),  a referent denounced as
‘outraging’ (2), and a given authority called upon to intervene (3). There is, indeed, no
outrage without being perceived and labelled as such (Rouayrenc 1996: 112).  Defining
outrage as being, first and foremost, a performative act of language leads us to pay close
attention to the particular ‘regimes of justification’ (Boltanski & Thévenot 1991) used by
any ‘outraged community’ and to its modes of generalizing the grievance in such a way
that it can engage a group, hence calling for public recognition (otherwise it would be
nothing more than a personal suffering).
33 It also invites us to look at how the denunciation is framed in order to make sense of what
constitutes the fourth pillar of the outrage mechanism, i.e. an ‘institutional setting’ or
‘repertoire of virtual interpretations and public sanctions that pre-exist and within which
the actors are embedded without always having a clear knowledge about it’ (Favret-Saada
1992:  257).  Labelling a perceived insult to a religious symbol as ‘blasphemy’ in India,
Pakistan or Bangladesh (see Baixas & Simon, Blom, Riaz in this volume), all countries
where Blasphemy Laws exist, but framing it instead as an attack to the ‘cultural heritage’
in France (see Centlivres in this volume), for instance, has to be understood in its specific
context.
34 This discursive war does not render the ‘condensing’ object of outrage irrelevant to the
study. That it can either be a word, an act or an image, is not inconsequential and shapes
the forms of the ‘outrage mechanism’. This volume actually includes an extremely diverse
range of outrageous items or acts that recently provoked collective reactions in South
Asia: drawings, printed words, dredging a canal, using religious symbols and committing
mass murders. Not all is meta-narration of course. Thomas Bouchet recalls that one of the
decisive characteristics of an insult, even when humorous, is that ‘it is an act of violence
[…] it denies its very name to its victim by imposing another one upon him/her. This
process is enjoyable yet it can break an individual, even destroy him’ (Bouchet 2005: 273). 
An outrage can generate humiliation such that it is often difficult, to repeat what has
been said or done. As a result, the reaction it generates inescapably involves reclaiming
agency and dignity, and displaying counter-emotions and norms in public demonstration
of esteem and respect towards precisely what has been insulted.
35 An outrage often looks like a matryoshka: what is publicly denounced somehow envelops
underlying and unvoiced offences. The ‘Taslima Nasreen affair’ is a case in point: the
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agitation was launched under the slogan of ‘Islam in danger’, but what seemed to have
been really intolerable was the behaviour, free thought and social life of an upper-class,
educated and professional young woman.7 The gender dimension, barely mentioned by
Nasreen’s detractors, sheds a different light on the controversy: it explains the extreme
violence of the attacks against her (she not only had to be banned from her country of
residence,  or even killed,  but  also savagely humiliated),  as  well  as  the longevity and
transnational dimension of the reactions. More than her writings, it was her very body
and/or physical (public) appearances that her opponents were tracking. Nosheen Ali’s
contribution to this  volume similarly  emphasizes  the smoke-screen characteristics  of
public  reactions  to  outrage:  albeit  focusing  on  a  seemingly  sectarian  issue,  the  Shia
mobilization against offensive textbooks in Pakistan’s Northern Areas, in the mid-2000s,
was also at a deeper level the contestation of a long-standing regional subordination and
denial of citizenship.
36 The prism of possible responses to an outrage is vast: belligerent silence, negation, irony,
insulting back, threats, judicial complaints, collective actions, and so on (Bouchet 2005:
11). To understand why certain outrages provoke collective mobilizations, while others
do not,  the  relational  and situational  dimension of  an outrage  has  to  be  taken into
account (Larguèche 2004: 35). An insult does not just unfortunately link the one who
insults to the one who ‘takes the blow’,  it  also upsets,  and eventually reshapes, their
relation: by exacerbating old stigmatizations and resentments, or by creating new ones. 
As a matter of fact, there is no outrage ‘which is not in situation, particularly when we are
interested in its political connotations or when we consider it  a modality of political
expression’ (Verdo 2005: 15). It is frequently the context itself that gives to any given
word or action its insulting character. The notion of ‘outraged communities’ coined here
in order to emphasize, and explore, the emotional, albeit often ephemeral, bonds that an
outrage provokes among those who experience it, does not render these collectivities into
a-historical entities. On the contrary, all the articles in this volume emphasize that they
are shaped in situ and at specific, often critical, historical junctures. More precisely, an
outrage often takes  its  full  meaning in the structure of  pre-existing and historically
situated  relations  of  power  and  the  corollary  assertion  of  moral  superiority  that
unavoidably accompanies them.
37 The feeling of anger that an outrage brings out has to be understood in this very context.
For analytical reasons, we have considered so far the moral component of an outrage in
isolation from its emotional dimension. But as stressed earlier, both are inter-functional:
an outrage does not only cause a moral shock, it makes one (righteously) angry. Anger is a
crucial component in collective mobilizations because it is a ‘sanctioning emotion’ (Flam
2005: 20). This is a point that anthropologist Robert C. Solomon has stressed forcefully:
Anger is not just a physiological reaction cum sensation plus an interpretation […] it
is essentially an interpretation, a view of its cause (more accurately, its ‘object’) and
(logically) consequent forms of behaviour […] it is ‘a kind of interpretation […] of
the world. It is […] a way of being-in-the-world, a relationship between oneself and
one’s situation. […] Anger, in other words, is essentially a judgmental emotion, a
perception of an offence (as Aristotle argued in Rhetoric) (Solomon 1984: 249-250).8
38 Hence, when being angry, one becomes the judge, and the other person the defendant
(while with contempt one is pure, blameless, and the other is despicable).
39 The sociological importance of anger in political life has recently been addressed (Holmes
2004). Politics, be it neutrally understood as the ‘constrained use of power’ (Goodin &
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Klingemann  1996:  7)  or  in  a  Schmittian  fashion  as  a  ‘foes  versus  friends’  process,
frequently  operates  by  ‘mobilizing  anger’  against  one’s  opponents  (Ost  2004:  239).
Conversely, public responses to illegitimate orders and perceived injustices are rarely
devoid of anger—although cynicism and/or resignation are also rational reactions. For
Peter Lyman (1981: 61), anger is therefore, ‘the essential political emotion’. It confronts
any political order to a difficult dilemma: it is a resource because listening to anger may
lead to a constructive public dialogue about the fairness of any political order (while
repressing it can provoke more damaging resentment, rage and violence) but, because
popular  anger  always  threatens  the  dominant  groups’  status  quo,  it  also  has  to  be
domesticated through force, moral righteousness, silence and technique. In any political
order therefore, ‘strong cultural and political norms that seek to suppress the expression
of  anger’  co-exist  with  the  equally  important  necessity  of  avoiding  the  danger  of
repressing it,  i.e. ‘that  essential  dialogues about  injustice may be suppressed as  well’
(Holmes 2004: 127).
40 The reactions of ‘outraged communities’ in the public arena, and the state’s response to
them, strongly highlight this dilemma. Exhortations to (appropriately) express anger and
encouragements—particularly  towards  subordinate,  oppressed or  excluded groups—to
repress  anger  are  intrinsic  features  of  public  politics.  But  once  anger  has
(inappropriately) erupted in the public sphere, depoliticizing it takes a great deal of the
challenged actors’ time: angry demonstrators are said to be manipulated or irrational, as
evidenced by the case of  the young Lahori  rioters  who protested against  the Danish
cartoons. As shown by Amélie Blom’s contribution in this volume, these rioters actually
found a socially and politically legitimate opportunity to assert a long-felt and multi-
faceted anger through their protests. This actually points to a critical characteristic of
‘outraged communities’ when they confront more powerful groups or institutions: they
have to reclaim the right to be publicly angry. Indeed, ‘since [anger] normally constitutes
the prerogative of the powerful’, writes Helen Flam (2005: 20), ‘social movements have to
re-appropriate the right to feel and display this particular emotion by their members’. In
his contribution to this volume, Nicolas Jaoul precisely describes the process of the Dalits’
reappropriation of anger, and how the social mapping of legitimate expression of anger
can be contested through the emotional work of social movements.
41 Without following Jack Barbalet (2001) when he argues that emotions in social life have
principally  to  do  with  class  resentment,  we  do  consider  outrage  and  anger  to  be
intimately  linked  to  a  power  relationship.  Most  of  the  case  studies  included in  this
volume demonstrate and explore this hypothesis, at the local and/or international levels,
though not always addressing it directly. When mobilizing over an ‘outrageous’ event,
socially  or  politically  excluded  groups—the  Dalits  in  India,  the  Northern  Area  Shia
minority and the urban middle-class youth in Pakistan for instance (see Jaoul, Ali, Blom)
—, as well as marginalized political parties once they are not in power anymore (such as
the  BJP  that  Jaffrelot  analyzes)  and  a  diplomatically  ostracized  regime  (such  as  the
Taliban studied by Centlivres), fundamentally enact and/or contest power relations.
42 This might explain why the public reaction provoked by an outrage usually operates in a
mirror-pattern: the outraging actors themselves reacting to an outrage felt previously; an
interesting finding that most contributors to this special issue also highlight. This is true
in  the  cases  of  T.  Nasreen when she  wrote  Lajja in  1993,  of  the  Taliban when they
destroyed the Buddhas of Bamiyan in 2001 or of the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten
when it published the cartoons representing the Prophet Muhammad in 2006 (see Riaz,
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Centlivres, Blom respectively). Sometimes, the prior outrage is not a particular event but
the very fact that a subjugated group dares to challenge the structure of domination (the
successful daughter of a Dalit family whose members were lynched in the Maharashtra
village that Jaoul studies), or simply dares to exist politically (the Muslims that can be
killed with impunity in the crowds, as Hansen analyzes in this volume).
43 Therefore, if  we agree that an outrage is always perceived as an attack against one’s
moral values or dignity, while being grounded in pre-existing relations of power, then its
public  display  also  informs  us  about  deeper  structural  changes  affecting  these  very
relations. As stressed by Claudine Haroche and Jean-Claude Vatin:
Consideration,  recognition,  deference,  respect,  dignity:  these  terms  […]  qualify
transitory,  unstable,  moving,  intangibles  yet  crucial  states.  They […] reflect  the
movements of  links and relations formed in social  systems,  whose more or less
structured nature varies according to places, societies and times (Haroche & Vatin
1998: 9).
44 The  historical  recrudescence  of  communal  mobilizations  around issues  of  communal
outrage in South Asia cannot be dealt with here, despite the importance of understanding
this temporality, or precisely because of it, since it would require a much deeper study
than the theoretical outlines that we intend to provide in this introduction. Yet,  one
cannot fail to notice that communal outrage became historically significant both in the
early  20th century  and  in  the  1980s-1990s,  two  periods  that  have  witnessed  strong
movements of mass politicization. We nevertheless hope that the case studies that have
been assembled here will provide material for such an endeavour.
 
The politicization of emotions: A social movement
perspective
45 The long silence suffered by emotions9 in social  movements’  theories is certainly not
based on their decreasing empirical importance in social protests. As stressed by Laurent
Thévenot  (1995:  147),  because  emotions  are  learnt  in  ‘situations  of  exchanging
expressions’, one might ‘quite naturally expect that emotions and their expressions play a
role in every collective situation where what is at stake is to coordinate intentions, in
particular  in  […] collective  mobilizations’.  Owen  Lynch  makes  a  similar  observation
regarding the self-contradictory disinterest for emotions in anthropological works:
If the passions are precisely those structures which connect and bind us to other
people (Solomon 1976: 19), then why until recently have anthropologists who claim
to study the structures that connect and bind us into social and cultural systems,
either considered them irrelevant or failed to question their assumed nature and
operation? (Lynch 1990: 4).
46 Taking the emotional texture of collective mobilizations seriously provides an extremely
rich entry point to study the politics of outrage in South Asia. However there is a long
way to go towards understanding their translation into effective collective action; a gap
forcefully encapsulated in a placard ‘Anger into Action’ held by a young woman during
one of the street demonstrations organized in Mumbai after the 26-28 November 2008
attacks and captured by TV channels  worldwide.  The difficulty lies  here in that  ‘the
current state of knowledge concerning the relationship between emotions and contention
is not sufficiently developed to allow for the construction of any systematic theoretical
framework’ (Aminzade & McAdam 2001: 15). 
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47 Indeed, if emotions were everywhere in the collective behaviours’ studies until the 1960s,
they  were  linked  only  to  intrinsically  ‘emotional  crowds’,  personality  conflicts  and
psychological problems. This interpretative sliding from bodies (behaviours observed at a
distance)  to  states  of  mind  was  undoubtedly  problematic  (Mariot  2001),  and  made
emotions  recede  in  the  shadow  afterwards.  They  had  no  place  in  the  rationalist,
structural,  and  organizational  models  that  followed.  These  models,  still  dominant,
consequently tell us a lot about how people act when they do not feel and fail to notice
‘the emotional energy required for,  and generated by disruption,  rule violations,  and
collective political  violence’  (Aminzade & McAdam 2001:  21).  Although the ‘collective
action  frame’  perspective10 fruitfully  reintroduced  culture  and  perceptions  to  the
discourse,  it  somehow  reduced  participants  to  ‘computers  mechanically  processing
symbols’ (Goodwin et al. 2001: 1) or to ‘Spock-like beings, devoid of passion and other
emotions’ (Bedford 1997: 419). 
48 The cultural turn in social sciences, in the last decade or so, has led to the revival of
emotions in the study of societies, and by extension of social movements and politics.
Now emotions are back, but almost exclusively in studying ‘egalitarian collectives’, such
as feminist, gay and lesbian, anti-nuclear, animal rights and victims’ movements, etc.;
these are furthermore movements exclusively based in America and Europe. The present
issue of SAMAJ precisely aims at demonstrating that the broad analytical framework used
in these recent works is as valuable for studying South Asian movements. The ambition is
not to offer a new, ‘better’ and invariant model but simply to recall that ‘the affectual and
emotional  dimensions  of  social  movements  are  as  important  as  the  cognitive  ones’
(Goodwin  &  Jasper  1999:  49).  Truly,  ‘environmental  circumstances,  including  strong
organizations and favourable opportunities, will not produce a movement in the absence
of heightened emotions’, while ‘widely acknowledged facilitators of mobilization operate
in large part through the emotional dynamics they set in motion’ (Aminzade & McAdam
2001: 14).
49 Some false dualisms certainly need to be clarified.  The first  dualism is the debatable
opposition  between  emotions  and  reason,  as  if  only  one  or  the  other  could  shape
behaviour  at  any  one  time.  This  disjunction,  inherited  from  the  rational  actor
perspective,11 proves to be fragile, because ostensibly any rational calculus also implies a
range of  affects.12 A number of  scholars  have,  indeed,  argued that  emotions support
rationality,  providing  it  with  salience  and  goals  (Elster  1999),  while  conversely  the
cognitive approach defines emotions as ‘embodied thoughts, thoughts seeped with the
apprehension that ‘I am involved’ (Rosaldo 1984: 143). As such, they arise out ‘of complex
cognitive understanding and moral awareness, reflecting our comprehension of the world
around us and sometimes of our place in it’ (Goodwin et al. 2004: 413).
50 Emphasizing that feeling pity or anger, for instance, is an active appraisal of a situation,
the social constructionist perspective further ‘rationalizes’ emotions: they are described
as  ‘judgments  of  situations  based  on  cultural  beliefs  and  values’  (Lynch  1990:  8-10),
learned or acquired in society. As stressed by Jeff Goodwin, James Jasper and Francesca
Polletta:
Moral outrage over feared practices, the shame of spoiled collective identities or
the  pride  of  refurbished  ones,  the  indignation  of  perceived  encroachment  on
traditional rights, the joy of imagining a new and better society and participating in
a movement towards that end—none of these are automatic responses. They are
related  to  moral  intuitions,  felt  obligations  and  rights,  and  information  about
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expected effects, all of which are culturally and historically variables (Goodwin et al.
2001: 13).
51 There is a certain danger in considering emotions as an extension of another form of
rationality, since it tends to negate that emotions have subjective or affective aspects in
their own right, which, in turn, have an effect on the participants’ actions.13 Yet, looking
at  emotions  as  automatic,  patterned responses  to  particular  social  stimuli,  and even
inherently linked to class belonging (Barbalet 2001),  poses a range of  methodological
problems.  Just  to  mention the  most  obvious  one:  social  scientists  work on emotions
expressed and interpreted by the actors on the basis of salient (socio-cultural) situational
factors, hence the question, ‘how does one legitimately move from what is observed (the
expression) to what cannot be observed (the emotion)?’ (Solomon 1984: 246) will remain
unanswered.
52 The second false dualism relates to the causal nature of emotions in mobilizations. In
most of the recent literature, there is a palpable uneasiness regarding the ‘explanatory
power’ of emotions in collective actions. Emotions are said to be ‘the reason we bother to
participate in movements at all, rather than sit on the sideline’ (Goodwin et al. 2004: 418)
or ‘like an unseen lens that colors all our thoughts, actions, perceptions and judgments’
(Goodwin et al. 2001: 10). They are described as ‘inducing inflexions in experiences and
revisions of one’s judgment and decisions […] [as well  as] innervating the direction of
categories and narratives’ (Cefaï 2007: 517, emphasis added). This ambiguity is actually
linked to a wider problem: after decades of research and a great number of theoretical
works and case studies, we strangely still know very little about the ‘passage to action’ or
how a predisposition to translates into an effective action (or inaction) (Fillieule 2001: 199).
What  is  needed to  fill  this  gap,  as  stressed by Olivier  Fillieule,  is  an account  of  the
‘activist’s trajectory’ or ‘career’.14
53 The last analytical dualism to be addressed, and an important one for the present volume,
concerns the assumed difference between ‘expressive’ social movements, displaying real
emotions, versus ‘instrumental’ ones manipulating participants’ feelings. A new category
of  research  on  ‘emotional  activism’  (Walgrave  &  Rihoux  2000)  sees  emotions  as  an
inherent property of a certain type of movements, such as victims’ associations. Although
it would be tempting to include protests by ‘outraged communities’ in this type of social
movement, the very categorization is scientifically indefensible. If certain movements are
‘emotional’, then what are the others? Indeed, nothing allows us to assume that anger,
shame, hope, affective bonds, etc. do not play as important a role in the trajectories of
‘material-reward oriented’ movements, such as factory workers taking on to the street to
get a raise in their salary. Secondly, the risk here is obviously to substantiate emotions
while ‘the strategies of self-staging,  the constraints of roles,  the norms of expressing
emotions’ (Latté 2006: 1) are all conveniently ignored.15
54 In contrast to the ‘emotional activism’ approach, the utilitarian perspective puts almost
all the emphasis on how social movements’ leaders ‘manipulate’, ‘manage’ and ‘organize’
their militants’ feelings. In other words, the ‘emotions to be mobilized’ prevail over the
‘mobilizing  emotions’  (Mathieu  2004:  564).  Leaders  and  activists  of  social  protests
certainly strategize what kinds of  emotions to stimulate and to display in the public
arena. But their calculations also depend on the assumptions they share with the public
about how emotions might work; an epistemology of emotion is also at play (Polletta
2001). Moreover, a rigid instrumentalist approach fails to consider that emotions might
make sense  for  the  ‘entrepreneurs’  themselves.  For  instance,  when Reverend Martin
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Luther King employed Christian themes in his speeches and ‘brought an […] accessible
frame to the [civil rights] struggle’ (McAdam 1996: 347), should we deduce that he made a
calculated decision? This would be as far-fetched as saying that he employed English
language  as  a  result  of  a  strategic  effort.  Why not  considering  that  King  ‘employed
Christian themes because, as a Baptist minister with a doctorate in theology, he actually
believed that those ‘themes’ were true or valuable for their own sake’ (Goodwin & Jasper
1999: 49)?
 
Emotions and ‘outraged communities’’ collective
actions: A research agenda
55 Analyzing the role of emotions in collective actions, and generally in political life, leads to
an unavoidable, yet thorny, encounter with psychology that anthropologists, sociologists
and political scientists alike are ill equipped to deal with (Braud 1996: 8). An acceptable
solution  could  be  to  distinguish  ‘micro-sociological  enunciations’  from ‘psychological
enunciations’. As social sciences do not focus, as such, on the individual as an object, ‘they
do not have to explain the type of motivations,  which are linked to his/her peculiar
personality’ (Braud 1996: 18); in other words, they can bring to surface the sociologically
relevant  enunciations  while  putting  aside  a  psychological  analysis  of  an  individual’s
behaviour.  This  is  easier  said  than  done  because  when  we  state  that  actors  are
‘preoccupied by’ or ‘sensitive to’ any given social, political or economic factor, we cannot
avoid a statement on the psychological dimension of their emotion.
56 Another  methodological  solution  could  be  to  focus  on  given  situations,  and  this  is
precisely what the case studies included in this volume of SAMAJ have attempted to do.
This  helps  to  avoid  the  shortcomings  of  both  the  instrumentalist  and  spontaneous
paradigms,  each claiming to tell  the truth about the individual’s  state of  conscience,
either  by  naturalizing  emotions  or  by  searching  for  ‘real’  motivations  behind  the
‘emotional mask’. Both fail to take emotions for what they are, that is ‘the product of
activities  whose  development  is  inseparable  from a  situation’s  layout’  (Jean-Philippe
Heurtin quoted in Latté 2006: 1). Indeed:
Emotions are operating in protest at multiple levels, from the micro-level processes
by  which  bystanders  become  participants,  to  the  emotional  repertoires  that
activists  draw  upon  when  pitching  their  case  in  different  settings,  to  the
organizational mechanisms through which particular emotions are managed, to the
macro-structural  shifts responsible  for  making  certain  emotions  legitimate
motivations for protest (Goodwin et al. 2004: 414).
57 As far as individual participation is concerned, emotions obviously do not automatically
drive people to join a collective protest. Yet, they certainly act as the ‘hot button’ that
Gamson (1992) talks about. Emotions also inform judgments, how problems are defined
and how grievances  are  shaped. For  instance,  scholars  have  puzzled  over  why state
repression in some cases decreases the chance of collective protest while in others it
increases it. The answer lays partly, state Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta (2004: 417), in the
management of emotions, and particularly of fear. For example: how great is the fear of
the police? How strong is the indignation over its repressive policy? Does the sense of
moral outrage spread to new parts of the population in response to state repression? Can
fear in high-risk activism be mitigated by shaming or by belief in divine protection, hence
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encouraging  people  to  protest  despite  their  apprehension  of  the  dangers  involved
(Goodwin & Pfaff 2001)?
58 This nevertheless leaves aside a crucial component of any collective mobilization: the
social movement organization, which is deeply involved in ‘emotion work’ or ‘emotion
management’ (Hochschild 1979),16 trying to change in degree or quality the emotions and
feelings motivating and guiding the movement and adapting them to specific conditions
and interactions. They have to transform grief into anger, anger into a sense of injustice,
and a sense of injustice into hope of change, for instance. Movement organizers work
hard to inspire and spread moral emotions, which sometimes define the movement itself:
pride (Gay Pride for instance), compassion (animal rights activists) or righteous anger
(the ‘outraged communities’ studied in this volume). They also have to reinforce loyalties
and  calm  fears  (Goodwin  &  Pfaff  2001).  All  this  ‘emotion  work’  is  done  while
simultaneously complying with the given ‘feeling rules’, that is the ‘guidelines for the
assessment of fits and misfits between feeling and situation’ (Hochschild 1979: 566).
59 A. R. Hochschild’s concepts prove particularly helpful to overcome the instrumentalist
bias. Without succumbing to the ‘real’ versus ‘fake’ emotions dichotomy, we are equipped
to analyze how ‘outraged communities’’ leaders and participants alike perceive, assess,
evoke  and  suppress  their  own  and  other  people’s  emotions,  while  pursuing  the
movement’s goals. We can also pay attention to the particular emotions that are worked
upon: do leaders attempt to mobilize primarily compassion, hope,  shame or anger in
order  to  attract  participants?  Do  they  capitalize  on  pride  and  guilt  to  maintain
commitments? Do they work on empathy and sympathy to attract bystanders? And what
happens when there are contested beliefs within a movement regarding the appropriate
range, intensity and targets of various emotions? In addition, when do movements foster
unconventional, ‘outlaw emotions’ (Jaggar 1989: 161) and when do they encourage, on the
contrary,  conformity  to  the  dominant  rules  of  the  wider  society?  In  analyzing  the
organizations’ work on emotions, we can finally focus on a regular, yet understudied,
pattern of collective actions, street demonstrations in particular: the ‘emotional warfare’
(Goodwin et al. 2004: 417) that protestors engage in with their opponents who are trying
to push them to make mistakes out of anger in order to discredit them.
60 But if the ‘emotion work’ approach proves particularly useful, emotions are not always
programmed, calculated or administered by entrepreneurs and participants alike, they
also exist at their pre-reflexive level. Daniel Cefaï (2007: 83) rightly asks: ‘Why cannot we
accept, and without having to subscribe to an irrationalist vision, that joy, fear, hatred,
despair,  envy  or  resentment  are  collective  experiences  that  have  a  strong  power  of
mobilization, independently of any project?’ While the public and collective expression of
emotions in the protest event itself and its rich dramaturgy are precisely where we can
study this affectual dimension, strangely, this level of observation is not mentioned in
Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta’s roadmap recalled above.
61 Collective protests, indeed, have an endogenous character: ‘the palpable sense of ‘we-
ness’ that defines peak moments of collective action is amongst the most emotionally
intoxicating and socially  connective experience one can have’  (Aminzade & McAdam
2001: 43), as shown by Thomas B. Hansen’s contribution in this volume. This certainly
does not mean that a single man in a crowd ‘does not know himself anymore’ (Durkheim
1912: 384).  It  is simply to recognize that there are strong emotions derived from the
activity of protesting: ‘collective affection, enthusiasm, joy, even wonder, at possibilities
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for social change; the pride of revaluing a stigmatized identity; the many pleasures of
protest from erotic attraction to avoidance of boredom’ (Jasper 1997: 108).
62 Crowds also redefine problematic situations and participate in reshaping moral orders17; 
a point emphasized in works such as those by Elias Canetti (1984) and also developed in
Oskar Verkaaik’s (2004) work on the Pakistan-based Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM).18
It is precisely the combination of the ludic character (hence emotional texture) of the
MQM’s protest events, their transgressive humour, and yet high level of violence, that
provided the most powerful means of mobilization. This does not render demonstrators
less  committed  to  the  cause.  Opposing  ‘excitement-seekers’  to  ‘morally  committed’
participants  is,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  a  crucial  component  of  the  entrepreneurs’  and
observers’  discourse,  especially  when riots  occur  (see  Blom in  this  volume)  and  the
respectability of the movement is to be rescued. Seeking thrill in a political crowd, rather
than in a movie hall for instance, actually points to the articulation between emotions
and moral visions: ‘the feeling of […] morality’ precisely arises in the group members’
mutual awareness of their shared focus of attention’ and their sense that what one is
doing has a higher importance (Collins 2001: 29). Moreover, and importantly, fun is never
function-less. In the case, again, of the MQM public manifestations, fun was a matter of
uprooting  ‘ethnic  and  religious  stereotypes  through  role  inversion  and  grotesque
exaggeration’ (Verkaaik 2003: 3), thus making the unimagined imaginable and allowing
for the escalation of social conflict.
63 Such an ethnographic analysis of South Asian crowds and publics is, indeed, an extremely
fertile path to follow so as to explore the rich and diverse political meaning of outraged
mobilizations that is, more often than not, revealed in the easily and popularly accessible
language  of  emotions.  Indeed,  people  gather  at  places  infused  with  emotional  and
symbolic  meanings,  where  identities  are  being  narrated  while  rituals  of  revenge,
reparation, civility or commemoration are being accomplished, and organizations battle
with one another through staged threats, attacks and seduction.
64 Finally, there is a fourth significant level at which the role of emotions in collective action
needs to be studied: the ‘macro-structural shifts responsible for making certain emotions
legitimate motivations for protest’ (Goodwin et al. 2004: 414). These shifts have principally
been studied in the social movements’ emotional culture. Surprisingly, the state, or more
broadly what Helen Flam rightly calls the ‘emotional-institutional’ context within which
social movements do their emotion work’ (Flam 2005: 19), is barely mentioned. Yet, for
specialists  of  South Asia,  wherein  the  colonial  legacy  of  taming—and simultaneously
defining—the ‘emotional subject’ has been so enduring, the state’s ‘politics of emotion’ is
simply impossible to avoid (see Ali, Blom, Hansen in this volume). A case in point is the
British Raj’s Blasphemy Laws that have been kept almost intact in India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh (and strikingly bears the same number, article 295, in both the Indian and
Pakistani Penal Codes). The state, through its legal apparatus and instruments of political
socialization, but also through the government’s manoeuvring (see Riaz in this volume),
determines (along with movement organizations)  which emotions can legitimately be
expressed publicly.
65 Taking into account the movement’s emotion culture while simultaneously looking at the
state’s might also help to understand why particular ‘vocabularies of motives’ (Polletta &
Amenta  2001:  309)  prevail  in  certain  locations  and  historical  periods,  while  others
disappear or decline.  Why was hatred directed against  India a legitimate emotion to
display in Pakistan’s streets for decades but declined after 2001, while hatred for Pakistan
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has become, again, a permissible public emotion in India in the post-2008 Mumbai attack
context?19 This  inquiry  is  particularly  important  for  us  at  a  wider  level:  why  was
‘protecting community symbols’ a prominent discourse in the 1910s and 1920s, and then
again, although it never fully disappeared in the meantime, since the 1980s?
 
The contributors
66 Thomas Blom Hansen’s contribution elaborates on the nexus between fire, violence and
collective  sentiments  in  India.  Drawing  on  material  from Mumbai  and  elsewhere,  it
reflects upon the fact that most collective violence never has any clear actors, or even
people  claiming  public  responsibility  or  providing  justification  for  their  actions.  He
argues that in a country saturated in political rhetoric, acts of violence tend to acquire
their  own  semiotic  register;  a  singular  form  of  ‘political  communication’.  They  are
represented as ‘pure events’, spontaneous combustion or spontaneous rage that arises
from  perceived  collective  grievances  and  insults.  Fire  is  critically  important  in  this
process of naturalizing violence: it is not only one of the densest cultural signifiers in
India,  but  also  at  the  heart  of  the  transgressions,  the  exceptions,  the  taboos,  the
sacrifices, the agency, the sense of communitas that unfolds in times of heightened conflict
with the state or with other communities.
67 In his ethnographic study of how anger becomes expressed publicly by the powerless,
Nicolas Jaoul brings to our attention a Dalit (‘untouchable’) protest movement against
caste violence (the 2006 Khairlanji massacre). Although anger is supposedly an emotion
used in an open and performative manner by the powerful to enact their domination, the
Dalit movement has engaged in an ‘emotion work’ that upsets such a social mapping of
emotions. The protest’s ideological content and framing of outrage illustrates the process
of social appropriation of anger by weaker sections of society as well as the politically
marginalized Dalits’  appropriation of  democratic  conceptions  through the vernacular
language  of  injustice  and  outrage  to  their  human  dignity.  The  paper  also  critically
discusses the sterile and biased concept of ‘axiological neutrality’ and advocates instead a
reflection on the heuristic possibilities entailed in the ethnographers’ personal exposure
to such an emotion work done by social movements.
68 Amélie Blom explores how long-distance outrages can provoke social protests, and even
riots. The demonstration against the Danish cartoons that took place in Lahore on 14th
February 2006 was primarily an expressive protest, publicly voicing its anger and moral
discontent. As such, it offers a fruitful micro-political site to understand how emotions
contribute to shape the culture of dissent in contemporary Pakistan. Based on interviews
with protestors, this article elaborates, first, on the linkages between anger, honour, the
cognitively framed belief  of  being ‘provoked’  and biographically embedded emotional
repertoires. Second, it looks at the conflicting emotions displayed in the public arena
during the protest  itself:  a  desire of  communitas,  yet  of  destruction,  an expression of
compulsory feelings, yet of subversive emotions. Finally, it argues that this protest takes
its full meaning only once replaced in the larger framework of the state’s singular politics
of emotion that informs public debates in Pakistan, and particularly so in Punjab.
69 Nosheen  Ali  examines  the  ‘textbook  controversy’  (2000-2005)  that  arose  when  the
Pakistani state introduced new, overtly Sunni textbooks in the Northern Areas, and the
local  Shia  population began to  agitate  for  a  more  balanced curriculum.  The  conflict
reached an acute stage during 2004-2005, as violent confrontations took place between
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Shia and Sunni communities,  and a constant curfew paralyzed daily life  in Gilgit  for
eleven months. She stresses that the Shia mobilization against the textbook was not just
another form of ‘sectarian’  outrage;  rather it  symbolized a broader political  claim to
inclusion in a context of long-standing regional subordination and religious suppression.
The politics of sectarian emotions in the Northern Areas must therefore be understood in
relation to  the  regulatory processes  of  state-making,  which are  the  very source  and
embodiment of ‘sectarianism’ and ‘outrage’ in the region.
70 In his contribution Ali Riaz also stresses the importance of ‘bringing the state back in’ so
as  to  explain  the  reactions  to  Taslima  Nasreen’s  perceived  outrage.  The  exiled
Bangladeshi writer was forced to leave India in 2008 following street agitation against her
writings in Kolkata. The events, which unfolded from the moment she was physically
attacked in Hyderabad to the time she was forced to leave the country, were reminiscent
of what happened in Bangladesh in 1994. In both instances, ‘outraged communities’ were
constructed, and symbols invented to mobilize the community. More importantly, in both
cases, the state forcibly removed Nasreen from the country to placate the agitators. This
article not only gives a detailed account of the events on the ground but also highlights
the importance of state responses to perceived outrage; an aspect which has received
little attention in the extant discussions over this controversy.
71 Pierre  Centlivres  analyzes  a  challenging  case  of  ambiguous  and  mirror-outrage:  the
destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan (Afghanistan) that opposed the Taliban and the
international community in 2001. He stresses the multi-faceted meanings of outrage and
the uncertainty characterizing the identification of the victims of the outrage: were they
the people in general, abstract deities, specific communities? The article then elaborates
on the argumentation and self-justifications presented by the Taliban,  their  sense of
indignation at a protest coming from ‘Christian’ countries, exclusively concerned with
saving ‘idols’ but ignorant of the ordeal endured by the Afghans. It finally shows that
conflicting visions over the very meaning of ‘cultural heritage’ were at the core of the
worldwide controversy.
72 Charlène Simon and Lionel Baixas focus on a protest, which started in Indian Punjab in
May 2007. It followed a ceremony performed by Baba Gurmeet Ram Raheem Singh, the
head of Dera Sacha Sauda, a peripheral Sikh sect whose membership mostly comprises of
Dalits. This ceremony was considered blasphemous by a section of the Sikh community,
since the religious leader had taken the appearance of the tenth Sikh Guru. This study
explores  the  reasons  that  have led  hundreds  of  Sikhs  from  very  different  social
backgrounds to take to the streets. One year later the authors look at how protestors
justify their participation in the protest and analyze the different definitions of what it
means to be a Sikh that came up during the mobilization. The authors emphasize the
pride to mobilize spontaneously and react immediately against an insult to the faith.
They argue that this very event contributed to enforce the perception of the Sikhs as the
archetype of the outraged community. 
73 Christophe Jaffrelot examines the difficulties of Hindu nationalists’ endeavour to mobilize
against the construction of the Ram Setu bridge between Sri Lanka and India in 2007.
Sangh Parivar activists have become experts in the art of being outraged. They articulate
a  deep-rooted  Hindu  majoritarian  inferiority  complex,  and  usually  denounce  the
disrespectful behaviour of the minorities, especially the Muslims, in order to mobilize
followers and polarize the society along communal lines. The controversy about the Ram
Setu also follows this  pattern.  But  this  time mobilizing and constructing the outrage
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proved much more complicated as the enemies deemed responsible for the victimization
of the Hindus were not Muslims or Christians, but the state and born Hindus. In this
interesting case of failed outrage, the Hindutva leaders appeared to be less concerned by
the sacred character of the symbol, hence revealing their present quest for non-religious
reasons, such as economic and strategic ones, for defending an object of outrage.
 
Conclusion
74 This second issue of SAMAJ does not aim at replacing one causal  model of collective
mobilization by another that would make emotions explain everything ‘else’ that could
not  be explained before.  But  it  does  hope to  contribute to  a  better,  and empirically
grounded, understanding of the emotional dynamics of collective mobilizations provoked
by perceived outrages in South Asia. In doing so, we hope to respond, partially of course,
to the invitation made by Ronald Aminzade and Doug McAdam (2002: 109) that ‘further
research  is  needed  before  we  can  make  any  strong  generalizations  concerning  the
relationship between appeals to particular emotions and particular types of movements,
movement cultures, or collective action repertoires’. The eight case studies included in
this volume are certainly far from providing a complete picture and represent only a
tentative attempt to stress the importance of moral outrage in South Asian collective
action. Yet, the narratives and staging of outrage analyzed here provide a rich material
that  may  shed  some  light  on  the  underlying  rationale,  shared  values  and  deep
contradictions  of  the  politics  of  dissent  in South  Asia,  whether  in  street  politics  or
through less conventional, and less noticed, forms of protest.
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NOTES
1. As Djallal Heuzé (forthcoming) suggests in a paper on the Shiv Sena affiliated clubs in Mumbai.
The marketing potential of this symbol all over the Subcontinent is also used by, for instance,
Pakistani leader Nawaz Sharif, who labels himself as ‘the tiger of Punjab’.
2. The contributions to this special issue emerged initially from the first SAMAJ International
Conference on ‘‘Outraged Communities’:  Investigating the Politicization of Emotions in South
Asia’, organized by the co-editors at the Musée du Quai Branly in Paris on September 25-26, 2008.
We express our gratitude to the Musée du Quai Branly’s anthropological research department
(and a special one to the research department staff for their extensive support), to the Centre
d'Etudes de l'Inde et de l'Asie du Sud (CEIAS-EHESS) and to the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches
Internationales (CERI-Sciences-Po.), all of whom were co-sponsors of this event. We would also
like to thank the participants and discussants at the conference, and more particularly Jacques
Pouchepadass who also made valuable comments on this introduction. Additionally,  this article
has greatly benefited from Mariam Mufti’s English editing.
3. The  four  others  are:  processions  (1);  rallies,  vigorous  appeals  to  primordial  feelings,
demonization of the enemy (2); ‘standardized forms of intimidation of the opponent’, violent acts
(3); bribes that facilitate the movements of crowds (4).
4. The  ‘moral  economy’,  an  economy  of  subsistence,  is  based  on  the  traditional  links  of
patronage, as opposed to the emerging capitalist economy.
5. A ‘moral shock’ can be enhancing but may also lead to passivity whenever the offended see
themselves as victims of forces beyond their control. People’s biographies (whose importance
Jasper  emphasizes  as  well),  their  personal  liking  or  disliking  of  being  in  a  crowd,  the
organization’s strategies and resource mobilization, the state’s repressive or facilitating policies
etc., are all factors that, in addition, motivate, rationalize and channel political action.
6. This analogy is all the more helpful because, in some cases, the mechanism simply fails to
clutch, as shown by Christophe Jaffrelot’s contribution to this volume on the ‘Hindu nationalists’
(not so easy) art of being outraged’.
Introduction. The Moral and Affectual Dimension of Collective Action in South...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 2 | 2008
24
7. We  are  very  grateful  to  Jérémie  Codron for  this  perceptive  comment  about  the  ‘Nasreen
controversy’. 
8. Aristotle wrote in The Rhetoric: ‘Take for instance the emotion of anger: here we must discover
what the state of mind of the angry people is, who the people are with whom they usually get
angry, and on what grounds they get angry with them. It is not enough to know the answers to
one or even two of these questions. Unless we know all three, we shall be unable to arouse anger
in anyone’ (quoted in Lynch 1990: 8). This is, as stressed by Owen Lynch, a particularly modern
intuition as emotion is not merely placed in the mind but also in a socio-cultural context. 
9. Emotions are defined at this stage as ‘any affective state which moves away from this zero
degree that complete indifference towards an object is’ (Braud 1996: 8). 
10. A frame is ‘an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by
selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of
actions within one’s present or past environment’ (Snow & Bedford 1992: 136-37).
11. A perspective, which paradoxically reproduced ‘the putative contrast between emotion and
rationality’ (Goodwin et al. 2004: 415) prevailing in the ‘collective behaviour’ approach before.
12. Affects  such  as  ‘the  passion  to  control  situations  of  uncertainty,  the  quest  for  maximal
efficiency’  and ‘a  need to assert  oneself,  without forgetting the pleasure of  playing strategic
games’ (Braud 1996: 43).
13. We are grateful to Nandini Gooptu for this insightful comment.
14. A ‘career’ is here understood objectively as status and jobs, but also, and more interestingly,
subjectively: as changes in the ways the individual perceives his existence and interprets the
meaning of his actions and what happens to him.
15. This is problematic because even the most detailed study of highly ‘emotional activism’ such
as the animal rights movement demonstrates that emotions ‘emerge and develop during the
process  of  becoming  an  activist,  when  challenged  by  outsiders  or  the  activists  themselves’
(Groves 1995: 457).
16. Arlie Russell Hochschild uses these two notions synonymously.
17. See  in this  regard,  French sociologist  Daniel  Cefaï's  pledge for  reopening the box of  the
collective behaviour, particularly the legacy of Robert Ezra Parks, one of the founders of the
‘collective behaviour’ school at Chicago University (Cefaï 2007: 43-53).
18. The MQM is a political organization that was established in 1984 claiming to represent the
Urdu-speaking migrants who left India for Pakistan in and after 1947.
19. Similarly we can ask why, for instance, did ‘rage’ become a prominent discourse among the
French suburban youth in the 1980s.
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